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Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between the degree of product market 
competition and the level of executive compensation for the largest 216 publically traded 
companies in U.S. manufacturing. Using 2005 CapitalIQ and Census data this paper finds that 
firm size has a substantial positive effect on the CEO’s total and annual cash compensation.  
These results also indicate that holding firm size as well as other measures constant, the 
degree of industry competition these firms face plays a small, but interesting role.  Consistent 
with the hypothesis based on the literature, industry concentration has a parabolic relationship 
with compensation such that boards offer the lowest compensation in oligopolistic markets.  
This result may be due to an increased ability of boards and shareholders to monitor CEOs at 
intermediate levels of competition.   
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“The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life” (J.R. Hicks, p.8, 1935) 
 
1. Introduction  
 
It is beyond dispute that competition has an important effect on a firm’s 
performance. Nevertheless the linkages between competition and performance are not 
well understood.  At some level the linkages must operate through influences on 
managerial and employee behavior. One expects firms to operate with higher levels of 
efficiency when the degree of industry competition is high and one expects the opposite 
when competition is lower.  This intuition is consistent with Leibenstein (1966), who 
finds large “x-inefficiencies” in less competitive markets.  He also finds that 
“organizational slack” causes more social welfare loss than the deadweight loss that 
results from monopoly price distortions.1,2  Consider the organization slack within Enron 
in which CEO Jeffery Skilling earned $14 million in salary and bonus and harvested $89 
million from stock and options from 1998-2001 despite the fact that Enron filed for 
bankruptcy in December 2001.  In perfectly competitive markets, however, social loss 
does not exist.  Machlup (1967) contends there is no room for slack since the market will 
force or drive out any firm that does not minimize costs completely.   
Despite the compelling theoretical argument that competition improves 
managerial decision making, there is mixed support for this hypothesis.  Hart (1983) and 
Schmidt (1997) suggest competition acts as a substitute or disciplinary mechanism to 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
1 Leibenstein shows the welfare loss due to price distortions (i.e. monopoly pricing or tariffs) is often less 
than or equal to 1/10 of 1 per cent, while the loss from organizational slack is often above 25%.   
 
2 Organizational slack is the excess capacity within an organization that occurs when resources are not used 
efficiently.  This may occur when firms pay employees too much, or do not utilize resources completely. 
" #"
reduce managerial slack and agency costs.3 When the degree of competition increases, 
shareholders are able to offer weaker incentives given that CEOs are implicitly motivated 
to work harder.  Others, such as Raith (2003) and Karuna (2007), find that when 
competition increases shareholders need to offer stronger incentives in order to help 
offset the greater risk of bankruptcy and to encourage the CEO to maximize performance.  
This paper examines whether competition acts as a substitute for monetary 
incentives and thus allows shareholders to pay executives less.  Principal-agent theory is 
related to CEO compensation (incentives) in section 2.  The objective is to discern if 
competition affects CEO compensation, and if so, how. Section 3 presents prior literature 
on performance, compensations, and competition. Section 4 discusses the sample 
selection, methodology employed, and the dependent and independent variable 
specification used herein.  Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 describes a 
robustness check. Section 7 summarizes key findings and proposes directions for future 
research. 
 
 
2. Theory of CEO Compensation 
 
Unlike most employees’ compensation, which relates closely to education, skill, 
experience, and job specific conditions such as heavy labor, CEO compensation is less 
straightforward.  Gayle and Miller (2009) discuss that since it is challenging to monitor 
CEOs’ activities, CEOs are rarely compensated for their inputs.  Instead, the board and 
shareholders structure compensation packages relating the CEO’s compensation to 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
3 Agency costs are part of executive compensation, which are unrelated to maximizing performance or 
shareholder interests.  "
" $"
various measures of performance such as improvements in the firm’s stock price, which 
are thought to proxy the CEO’s effort.   
Tying a CEO’s compensation to the firm’s performance typically requires the 
CEO to hold a substantial amount of assets, such as options, stock and or restricted stock 
which are sensitive to firm performance.  Moral hazard may exist if a substantial portion 
of the CEO’s wealth is tied up in the firm.4  From a shareholder’s perspective if 80% of 
the CEO’s net wealth is tied to firm performance, this may induce the CEO to be more 
risk averse than the shareholders view is optimal. 5 However, if the CEO holds a 
considerable amount of options that are “at-the money”, he might concentrate on meeting 
short-term earnings at the expense of creating long-term shareholder value, in order to 
maximize his personal wealth. The board faces two key challenges with respect to 
monitoring and motivating the CEO to run the firm in the shareholder’s best interest.  The 
first is asymmetrical information, since the CEO knows more about the day-to-day 
operations and short-term forecasts for the firm than do both the shareholders and board 
of directors.  The second is that the CEO’s and shareholders’ preferences are 
incompatible in which case interests may diverge (Sappington, 1991; Stiglitz, 1988). 
 
 
2.1.1 Principal-Agent Theory 
 
 Figure 1 (see page 5) models the problem in which principals have coarse 
information concerning the agent’s abilities and that the agent’s preferences diverge from 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
%"Moral hazard exists when a party, in this case the CEO, is insulated from risk which may induce him to 
behave differently that if he were fully exposed to the same risks as shareholders. 
5 Note that hereafter this paper uses “he” when referring to CEOs given that the vast majority of CEOs in 
the sample and among US companies are males.""
" %"
those of the principal.6 The shaded region in figure 1 represents asymmetrical 
information, which prevents the board from setting an optimal performance target.  If the 
principal has perfect information, the plan/performance target would be a single point on 
the graph.  Note that the agent’s (CEO’s) incentive function in figure 1 is sloped 
differently from the principals (shareholders) apparent preferences (approximately 45 
degrees from the origin). The difference in preferences is captured by the fact that for the 
same amount of effort the CEO would prefer to maximize his own compensation and 
receive greater pay. 
The inherent “agency cost” is shown in the difference in compensation (and 
preferences) between points B and C for a given performance level. The shareholders 
prefer point C, as they can offer fewer incentives to the CEO to obtain the desired 
performance.  The CEO’s most optimal point to operate  - in which he can optimize his 
own preferences and avoid shareholder interference - is point B. Ultimately the CEO 
prefers to be at point A as it maximizes his own preferences, however this point is not 
optimal from the shareholders’ perspective as it is outside the range of discretion.  At any 
point outside of the range it is impossible for the CEO to meet any combination of the 
acceptable performance.  If the CEO were to operate at point A the likelihood that the 
shareholders interfere and the CEO would be caught increases drastically.   
In this paper I hypothesize that as the degree of industry competition increases, 
shareholders and the board should obtain additional information that should shrink the 
range of discretion.  With more firms in an industry, shareholders and boards should have 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
6 This approach is adopted from John Michael Montias who first applied this graph to the case of a 
hypothetical manager in Soviet Style central planning.  See Montias in Bornstein, Morris “Plan and Market: 
Economic Reform in Eastern Europe.” Yale University Press, 1973. 
" &"
more information about true performance possibilities reducing the distance between 
points B and C, and attenuate the agency cost.7 The smaller range of discretion 
effectively disciplines the CEO as it limits the possibility for the CEO to cheat without 
detection.8 It is also possible that a greater risk of bankruptcy (associated with a higher 
degree of competition) aligns the preferences of the agent with the principal such that the 
shareholders’ preferences (Up) = CEO’s preferences (UA).  The preference compatibility 
enables shareholders to offer the CEO weaker incentives.""
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.2 Oligopoly Theory: Building off Principal-Agent Theory 
 
Just as competition serves to align the CEO’s and shareholders’ incentives, it also 
minimizes the CEO’s asymmetrical information advantage.  Given the CEO’s proximity 
to the company’s daily operations, he has an information advantage over the board and 
shareholders, Iagent >> Iprincipal.  The CEO seeks to preserve this advantage and to pursue 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
7 Note that the real situation of agency cost and operating in the range of discretion is far more complex and 
multi-dimensional.  The graph shown is static and thus does not include the dynamic nature of how 
competition shrinks the range of discretion. 
8 If the CEO were to operate outside of the range of discretion the likelihood that he would be caught 
increases, as the CEO has not met an appropriate target level. 
" '"
his objectives which may not be consistent with the shareholders’. Consider for instance 
the CEO who might prefer short-term profits that materially affect his bonus, but which 
come at the expense of impairing long run profits. 
The board’s inability to determine the CEO’s true potential or production 
possibility frontier (PPF) represents asymmetric information, which is a standard 
depiction of the principal-agent problem.  The board can only approximate a range of the 
CEO’s feasible capabilities, which complicates determining the optimal performance 
level.  As the degree of competition increases, it provides the board with increased 
information about the CEO’s true capabilities which may help the board set a more 
feasible performance target.  Additionally, CEOs which face increased competition may 
be less likely to undertake dysfunctional behavior that might allow rival CEOs to capture 
their market share.  That is they might lack Hick’s “quiet life.” 
The idea that competition acts as a disciplinary mechanism enabling shareholders 
and the board to offer CEO’s weaker incentives is straightforward.  Up to a certain point, 
competition makes it easier for the board and shareholders to monitor the CEO’s actions, 
thereby reducing the CEO’s ability to slack.  As more firms enter the market, the board is 
able to observe the actions and performance of other CEOs in the same industry as a 
reference point, which enables them to better evaluate managerial actions.  Competition 
helps not only to reduce not only the asymmetrical advantage but also to minimize 
agency costs – which increases the likelihood that the CEO will run the firm in the best 
interest of shareholders.  For example, in the beverage industry it might be easier for 
shareholders of Pepsi to monitor their CEO by simply looking at the performance of 
Coke. 
" ("
It is possible that there exists a signal-to-noise ratio wherein it is more difficult for 
the board/shareholders to extract useful information concerning CEO performance when 
the number of competing firms gets too large.  When there are only a few CEOs in the 
industry, the CEOs may choose to enter into strategic decisions dependent on each 
other’s actions. At a level of industry concentration similar to oligopoly market structure, 
shareholders may be able to better monitor the CEO via information from the tactical 
decisions and co-operations.  As more firms enter the industry, the board’s ability to 
monitor the CEO decreases, and thus the CEO has an increased impetus to cheat.  Figure 
2 (see below) shows the parabolic relationships among industry concentration, the 
board’s ability to monitor the CEO, and CEO compensation.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
)"The notion of managerial entrenchment being associated with higher compensation is taken from Shleifer 
and Vishny Management Entrenchment (1989)."
" *"
3.1 Literature Review: Compensation and Performance  
 
Earlier literature adopts the labor market approach to focus on determinants of  
CEO pay.  Roberts (1956) is one of the first authors to apply this economic theory.  He 
uses financial and compensation data from the Securities and Exchange Commission of 
2,000 corporations over four different one-year periods. After calculating the partial 
correlation coefficients on both size (net sales) and profit (net income), Roberts 
concludes that size has a greater effect on executive compensation than profit.  Using 
pooled CEO compensation data, Agarwal (1981) and the team of Finkelstein and 
Hambrik (1989) support Roberts’s findings regarding size and performance as 
determinants of compensation.  Finkelstein and Hambrik find a positive relationship 
when they conduct multiple cross-sectional regressions on pooled compensation data 
from Forbes and Compustat.10  The positive relationship among company size, job 
complexity, performance, and compensation supports the labor market theory regarding 
determinants of compensation. 
More recent literature adopts the principal-agent theory to address the notion of 
“pay-performance”. Jensen and Murphy (1990) conduct multiple difference in difference 
regressions to analyze how performance affects multiple facets of CEO compensation; 
their paper is one of the earliest studies in this literature.11 They match compensation data 
from the Forbes Executive Compensation Surveys (1974-1986) with fiscal-year 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
10 Finkelstein and Hambrick measure firm size with the log of total assets to reduce heteroskedasticity, and 
express all dollars in 1983 dollars (deflated by the CPI). 
11 Note that Jensen and Murphy address the endogeneity issue by using first differences as opposed to 
simultaneous equations.  They examine how a change in shareholder wealth affects the change in CEO 
compensation (this is the basis of the difference in difference regression). Please see their 1990 paper 
“Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives” for all their measures of compensation. The change in 
shareholder wealth is “rtVt-1” where rt = inflation adjusted rate of return on common stock, and Vt-1 = firm 
value at the end of the prior year. 
" )"
corporate performance data from Compustat.  They find that for every $1,000 increase in 
shareholder wealth, the average CEO’s pay increases $3.25 (of which $2.50 is 
attributable to gains from stock ownership but only 1.35 ¢ to increases in his salary and 
bonus).  They contend that the increase in CEO pay is too small to properly align 
shareholder and CEO’s interests and suggest that performance and compensation are not 
closely related. 
Hall and Liebman (1998) refute the argument that CEOs, like bureaucrats, are 
paid independent of their firm’s performance.  They use new CRSP data to measure 
precisely how a change in the company’s share price affects the CEO’s stock and option 
value.12  They note that a 10% increase in firm value results on average in a $1.25 million 
increase in CEO wealth (of which salary and bonus comprise only $24,300). Hall and 
Liebman argue that since stock and options awards account for approximately 98% of the 
pay-performance relationship, CEO pay is more sensitive to firm performance than 
initially indicated. 
The endogeneity between CEO compensation and firm performance is a central 
issue in empirical investigations. If these two factors determine one another, the result is 
a circular effect in which compensation affects performance, which in turn affects 
compensation.  Such a relationship suggests that compensation or incentives cannot be a 
function solely of performance but that instead a feedback effect exists. Barnhart & 
Rosenstein (1998) use three systems of simultaneous equations to contend that CEO pay, 
firm performance, and board composition are jointly determined.  Agrawal & Knoeber 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
12 The CRSP data contains detailed information on option grants, option gains, and total options held as 
well as the number, exercise price, and the time to maturity of the options, which enables the researchers to 
precisely calculate the change in the value of a CEO’s stock option holdings for a given change in firm 
value.  
" !+"
(1996), who also use simultaneous equations, argue that only board composition has a 
significant effect on compensation and performance. 
 
 
3.2 Competition and Compensation  
 
 Within the pay-performance literature, prior research (Aboud and Kaplan, 1996 
and Hartzell and Starks, 2003) attempts to proxy competition with industry specific 
dummy variables.  Hartzell and Starks (2003) use an industry dummy variable to control 
for pay similarities in industries, but they do not capture any measure of industry 
concentration or market structure. This is a coarse measure of competition as it 
incorporates all other industry specific characteristics unrelated to competition.  This 
paper attempts to add to the existing literature as it directly incorporates measures for the 
degree of competition and their effect on executive compensation.  Given that prior 
literature has indicated that the relationship between competition and compensation is 
ambiguous, this paper uses an additional measure of competition in an attempt to better 
capture competition’s complex nature.  Similar to Karuna (2007) this paper uses product-
substitutability as an additional dimension of competition instead of using only the single 
measure of industry concentration to measure competition.13   
 
 
3.2.1 Competition and Compensation: Theory 
 
 Assuming that firms’ cost structures are related, an increase in the number of 
competitors generates additional information not available in a monopoly. The board can 
use the information to better monitor executive behavior and minimize managerial slack.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
13 Karuna argues concentration alone is a poor proxy for competition. Thus he and this paper use additional 
variables to measure multiple dimensions of competition. 
 
" !!"
Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) examine how competition affects compensation and 
managerial slack.  They argue that if the costs of implementing a lower level of effort are 
less than the costs of implementing a higher level of effort, as the degree of competition 
increases, then the average manager will subsequently work less (i.e. slack more). They 
find the manager can increase his pay if he is able to exploit the additional information, 
but that competition has an ambiguous overall effect on effort.   
Scharfstein (1988) supports Nalebuff and Stiglitz’s findings which show that 
executives can receive increased pay under increased levels of competition.  Scharfstein 
creates a purely theoretical compensation structure in which each manager’s wage 
depends solely on his firm’s performance.  He shows that if a manager’s marginal utility 
from income is strictly positive, then an increase in the degree of competition may 
increase managerial slack and ultimately compensation.  His results contradict Hart’s 
(1983), who contends that competition unambiguously reduces slack – that managerial 
slack is lower with competition than in a single non-profit maximizing monopolist firm.14  
Managerial preference specifications are largely responsible for how the degree of 
competition can either increase or decrease incentives. The mixed results among Hart 
(1983), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), and Scharfstein (1988) suggest that the mechanism 
through which competition affects compensation (incentives). 
Schmidt (1997) constructs a purely theoretical optimal incentive scheme for 
executive compensation as a function of competition.  He finds that an increase in 
competition increases the firm’s likelihood of exiting the marketplace (being acquired of 
going bankrupt), which motivates the manager to exert more effort. In this scenario the 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
14 Hart (1983) assumes managers are inherently risk adverse and that income above a subsistence level 
holds no value while income below that level is catastrophic. 
" !#"
board provides weaker incentives, since managers are implicitly motivated to work 
harder to remain in the market. Schmidt concludes with standard economics that 
increased competition reduces a firm’s profit.   He also contends, however, that reduced 
profits make it less attractive for the CEO to work more effectively.  Consequently 
shareholders may need to provide additional incentives to motivate these CEOs to 
compensate for the increased expected utility loss.  Schmidt argues that the total effect of 
competition on effort is ambiguous in part, because the amount of effort the CEO exerts 
is contingent on the amount of competition. 
 More recently, Raith (2003) uses a purely theoretical principal-agent model to 
examine the effect of competition in an oligopoly setting. A critical aspect is the 
assumption in his model is that free-entry and exit endogenously determine the market 
structure.  Raith notes that if market structure is endogenous, then changes in the nature 
of competition lead to changes in the market.  In such a scenario, the degree of 
competition, the optimal incentive plan, and market fundamentals such as entry cost, 
market size, and product substitutability determine the equilibrium market.  As the degree 
of competition increases due to lower entry cost or industry concentration, shareholders 
provide stronger incentives to their managers.  
 
 
3.2.2 Competition and Compensation: Prior Empirical Literature 
 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) empirically test the hypothesis that competition 
reduces incentives; see table 1 for an overview. They derive an optimal executive 
compensation contract, which includes both firm and industry performance, under 
differentiated Bertrand competition.  They conduct a cross-sectional analysis using 1995 
" !$"
executive compensation data from Standard and Poor's ExecuComp and the 1992 
Herfindahl Indices from the Commerce Department’s Census of Manufactures.   They 
find that in more competitive industries, firms place a greater weight on rival firm 
performance than on their own firm performance.  They also find that the sensitivity of 
compensation to rival firm performance increases as the degree of industry competition 
increases. 
 Karuna (2007) conducts an empirical analysis on public companies from 1992-2003 
to determine how managerial incentives are a function of competition. He argues that 
since the relationship between industry concentration and compensation is unknown, a 
single variable cannot completely measure competition.  Karuna uses a price-cost margin 
(proxy for product substitutability), market size, entry cost, and industry concentration to 
measure multiple dimensions of competition.  He finds negative coefficients on both the 
price-cost margin and entry cost variables.15  This implies that overall shareholders will 
offer stronger incentives when the degree of industry competition increases.  Karuna also 
shows the ambiguous nature of the relationship between concentration and incentives, 
suggesting that concentration alone may not be a good proxy for competition. 
Adding to Raith’s (2003) and Karuna’s (2007) findings, this paper uses data from 
Standard and Poor’s CapitalIQ database, Morningstar Financial, and the Census of 
Manufactures report in the 1997 and 2002 Economic Census to test the effect of 
competition on executive incentives.  To measure incentives, this paper uses total CEO 
compensation as well as the component defined only as annual cash compensation (salary 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
15 The coefficient on the entry cost variable is significant at 1%.  The negative coefficient on both variables 
suggests as entry cost and price-cost margin increase (the degree of competition falls) and compensation 
decreases 
" !%"
+ bonus).  As measures of competition this paper uses the traditional industry 
concentration measure – the Herfindahl Index – as well as a price-cost ratio as a proxy for 
the degree of product substitutability.16  This paper constructs a model to examine 
whether competition provides shareholders and the board with increased information to 
enable them to offer lower compensation (weaker incentives).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
16 See Table  8 & 9 in the appendix for variable definition and construction 
" !&"
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Model Overview: Compensation = F (performance, competition) 
 
4.1 Methodology & Sample Selection 
 
To investigate the relationship between the extent of industry competition and 
CEO compensation, this paper conducts numerous OLS regressions at the firm-specific 
level, which allows for inter-firm differences that may affect incentives. This paper uses 
the following equation:  
 
Compensation = !0 + !1Performance + !2Revenue + !3Employees +  
                              "4CEOtenure + !5Age + !6Concentration + !7Concentration
2 +  
   + !8Substitutability + !9Substitutability
2+ !10 Capitalconstraint +   
    !11Institutions   + !12Outsidedirectors + D1CEOchair 
 
 
In an agency setting the amount of total compensation and annual cash 
compensation affect firm performance. The compensation variable serves as an incentive 
mechanism to maximize firm performance.  In addition, the level of performance affects 
the level of compensation. Thus firms that perform well may reward the CEO with higher 
compensation.  CEO pay is contingent upon factors, such as competition which affect the 
agency problem. Theory suggests that the degree of industry competition is related to 
CEO compensation in a non-linear or potentially parabolic manner.  Therefore the 
estimating equation includes the squared values of industry concentration and product 
substitutability.    
In an industry with minimal competition, there could exist the quiet monopolist – 
such that the CEO does not maximize performance as he might assume it is unlikely he 
will get caught if he performs below capacity.  As additional firms enter this industry, 
CEOs might co-operate and essentially enter into tactical decisions.  In these situations 
" !("
the board and shareholders may be better able to monitor a CEO’s actions, and improve 
the likelihood of detection (i.e. if the CEO exhibits managerial slack or cheats) However, 
as the degree of industry competition continues to increase there could be a point when 
the board is unable to accurately/closely monitor a CEO’s behavior.  Also firms in 
competitive markets face an increased risk of bankruptcy or liquidation so they have to 
offer CEOs greater pay in order to compensate for the increased risk.  It is plausible that 
firms do not maximize performance due to either managerial slack (in a highly 
concentrated or monopoly market) or to bankruptcy risk (in highly competitive markets).  
This suggests that the degree of competition has a parabolic relationship with 
performance and consequently compensation. 
 The CEO’s human capital and experience as well as the firm size affect the level 
of CEO pay.  Following the accepted practice in literature to correct for the non-normal 
distribution, this paper uses the natural log of full time employees and annual revenue. In 
addition this paper uses the natural log of CEO compensation and the number of years as 
CEO.  
The data for this paper come from 2005 cross-sectional data about the largest 216 
public companies, published in the 1996 Forbes Fortune 500 and 2009 Forbes Global 
2000.
17 Firms which were acquired, went bankrupt, or went private over the 12 year 
period are not included in the sample.  This creates a potential survivor bias, since the 
included companies are the largest publicly traded companies in both 1995 and 2008, 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
17 The largest companies are based on market capitalization.  2005 refers to the 2005 fiscal year.  This 
paper excludes Apple Corporation as Steve Jobs received only $1 for both annual cash and total 
compensation.  Such compensation is atypical for a CEO and thus does not represent an accurate picture of 
managerial incentives. 
" !*"
which were still public companies in 2009.  Survivor bias may be an issue if the firms 
that exited the market and those that “survived” responded differently to competition. 
If there is a survivor bias, it is possible that the effect of the degree of competition 
and the level of compensation of survivor firms do not represent the larger population of 
firms. This paper uses a dummy variable and an interaction term to capture the effect of 
degree of competition on compensation for firms that have exited the market and those 
which are public companies today.  The data used to investigate this possible bias and to 
check for robustness are a 2005 cross-section of the largest 258 public companies 
published in the Forbes Fortune 500 and Global 2000 in 1996, 2006, and 2009.  The 
results of this analysis (discussed later in the robustness section) suggest there is little if 
any survivor bias. 
Initially this paper sought to use panel data, but given the limitation within the 
industry concentration data from the Census of Manufacturers report, such an analysis 
was not possible.18 While a panel dataset is ideal, as it would allow for the use of fixed 
effects to control for unobservable time-invariant firm-specific determinants of 
compensation (i.e. corporate culture), the use of a cross-sectional analysis is acceptable. 
Consider a firm with a “big-pay” culture in which there is a sort of “slack” versus a firm 
with a “low-pay” culture such as 3M, which many would argue has a “good corporate 
culture” and little “slack”.  A cross-sectional analysis is not able to disentangle the 
potential relationship between culture and competition to establish which if either is a 
determinant of pay.  This paper uses a first difference analysis in attempt to control for 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
18 This paper can only use the 1997 and 2002 Census data to measure industry concentration as the 2007 
industry concentration measures are not available until fall 2010.  It is therefore not possible to use panel 
data, for the static nature of the competition variable cannot capture the change in performance and 
compensation.   
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the effect of culture on compensation and thus examine whether the degree of 
competition has an effect on compensation.  
While the initial regression uses 2005 CEO compensation and 2002 Census data 
in the cross-sectional analysis, the first difference approach uses the change in 
compensation (2004-2005) and degree or level of competition (from either the 1997 or 
2002 Census).  The dependent variable in the first difference equation is the change in 
CEO compensation from 2004 to 2005 and the competition variables are the Herfindahl 
index and the price-cost ratio in either 2002 or 1997.  The results of this analysis show 
that while statistically insignificant, the coefficient on industry concentration and price-
cost ratio are consistent with the cross-sectional analysis.  This supports the oligopoly 
theory; however the coefficient on the industry concentration and price-cost variables are 
insignificant and not pursued. This paper uses the 2005 fiscal year in order to limit the 
difference in time (from 2002 to 2005), which derives from combining different data 
sources. 
The CEO compensation data as well as CEO tenure and age are from CapitalIQ.  
This paper combines compensation data with firm specific data from proxy statements 
with competition data from the Census Manufactures report in the 2002 Economic 
Census (at the disaggregated 4 digit North American Industrial Classification Scheme - 
NAICS level).  The US Census Bureau provides comprehensive narrowly defined 
industry data for the manufacturing sectors (2-digit SIC codes ranging from 20 to 39).19,20 
The final sample contains 216 firms for the 2005 fiscal year. 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
19 The sample excludes any company which has an SIC code outside of 20-39 as the Census only calculates 
an industry concentration (Herfindahl Index) measure for the manufacturing industry (SIC codes 20-39).  
Consequently the number of firms falls from 880 to 216; 880 are the largest firms in 1995 and 2005 across 
all industries. 
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4.2 Variable Specification 
 
Measures of Executive Compensation 
 
Previous literature (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Yermack, 1995; and Hall and 
Liebman 1998) finds that equity-based compensation is the most performance sensitive 
part of CEO compensation. Equity-based compensation generally comprises the bulk of 
incentive compensation and dominates other forms of compensation such as salary, bonus, 
and other forms of short-term and long-term compensation.  For the 216 CEOs which 
comprise the initial sample, equity-based compensation comprises only 27% of the total 
compensation.21  The CEO receives restricted stock and option awards that provide him 
with an additional impetus to maximize performance and firm value.  The stock and 
option awards directly relate the CEO’s and shareholders’ preferences, which helps to 
partly mitigate the principal-agent problem. 
This paper uses annual cash compensation (Hall & Liebman, 1998, and Core et al., 
1999) and total compensation to measure CEO incentives.22  Figure 3 (Appendix 1) 
shows for the select sample, each component’s percentage of the total compensation. 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
20 In 1997 the census shifted the classification system from SIC to NAICS.  They constructed concordance 
tables to enable comparison between the industries at the four-digit SIC code level in 1992 and the same 
industries in the NAICS code levels.  The Census defines comparable as: “NAICS derivable from SIC”, 
almost comparable: “sales or receipts from SIC are within 3% of NAICS”, and non comparable as “NAICS 
sales or receipts cannot be estimated within 3% from SIC data”.  None of the industries I matched fell into 
the non comparable category"
21 One potential reason that restricted stock grants are 27% of total compensation is that the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) did not require corporations to expense restricted stock or option 
grants until 2006. Prior to 2006 firms did not have to report the value of restricted stock or option grants.  
Rather firms could report the number of shares granted without any value.  Thus the portion of equity-
based compensation in this sample is likely smaller than the actual % of equity-based compensation due to 
reporting regulations. 
22 Note this paper uses the natural log to measure compensation in an attempt to correct for the non-normal 
distribution of the raw data. 
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Annual cash compensation is the sum of salary + annual bonus.  The average cash 
compensation is approximately 47% of total compensation for the 216 CEOs in this 
paper’s sample.  Total compensation contains all sub-categories of compensation, and 
includes equity-based components (restricted stock and option grants) and “other perks”. 
 If a firm grants too large a percentage of compensation in options or restricted 
stock, then the CEO may seek to maximize near-term profits at the cost of long-term 
earnings.  If however, the CEO believes, that the incentives are too low, then he may not 
exert sufficient effort to meet the performance target.   The board and shareholders often 
offer additional non-performance related components of compensation to entice the 
executive to maximize shareholder value.  These “perks”, for example, include personal 
use of corporate aircraft, retirement plans, and company-paid premiums for supplemental life 
and health insurance.  One challenge with measuring CEO compensation is the variation in 
reporting which many companies report in the annual executive compensation table.  Thus 
one company may define as “other annual compensation” what another may define as 
“annual other compensation even though the average CEO may receive both categories of 
compensation annually.”23  Given the complex nature of CEO compensation, detailed 
information on the multiple components of “perks” or “other compensation” could 
provide a more comprehensive picture about the actual incentive structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
23 Components which might be included as annual other compensation are personal travel expenses or 
country club memberships.  Firms may include items such as the use of corporate aircrafts and retirement 
plans as other annual compensation.   
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Measures of Product Market Competition 
 
Since competition is a multifaceted concept, it is challenging to capture both price 
and non-price components of competition that a firm faces.24  As prior literature often 
uses a single measure for industry concentration such as the Herfindahl index (HHI) to 
measure the degree of competition (i.e. Aggrawal and Samwick, 1999; Defond and Park, 
1999), so too does this paper. The Census calculates the HHI index based on the sum of 
the market share squared for the 50 largest firms at the 4-digit NAICS code level.  
 One limitation of the Herfindahl or industry-based measure of concentration is 
that it assumes a one-to-one correspondence between the industry code and the firm’s 
product market(s).  Thus a conglomerate such as 3M is assigned one industry code, 
despite its products being spread across many industries (ranging from health care, 
industrial transportation, to consumer and office business).  Another limitation of using a 
Herfindahl or similar index as the sole measure of the degree of competition is that it 
assumes that market structure is exogenous. Ass concentration falls prices fall, and, 
therefore, the degree of competition increases for a given industry, when market structure 
is exogenous.  More recently Raith (2003) contends that when market structure is taken 
as endogenous, it is not clear whether low values of concentration capture low or high 
competition.   
Karuna (2007) constructs a price-cost margin variable, which he defines as: 
industry sales / (cost of materials + production workers’ wages).  This paper uses this 
same variable in an additional measure to capture the degree of competition.  The 
variable should reflect economic intuition such that as an industry moves closer to perfect 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
24 Aspects of non-price competition include product development, brand differentiation, advertising, and 
promotional expenditures. 
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competition, marginal revenue (i.e. price) comes closer to equaling marginal cost.  As the 
price-cost ratio becomes smaller, it presumably represents a higher level of product 
substitutability (and degree of competition).  One limitation of this variable is the 
inability to compare two firms in which one subcontracts out its manufacturing (e.g., 
Nike) versus another does its own.  A more accurate measure would be to construct the 
variable as (revenue / cost of goods sold) for each firm in a given business or industry 
segment.   
 
 
Measures of Control Variables 
 
This paper includes multiple control variables in the regressions which, prior 
research indicates, affect incentives.  To measure firm performance this paper uses the 
one-year total stock return for a given year and the prior year. Both measures are 
consistent with previous literature (i.e. Gibbons and Murphy, 1989; Core et al., 1999; and 
Cyert et al., 2002). A problem with using only a single one-year stock return is that there 
could be too much variance in too short a time period to capture normalized firm 
performance.   
To control for institutional ownership and regulation, this paper uses the 
percentage of stock which the top 250 institutional shareholders own.  Stiglitz (1985) 
argues that concentrated ownership is one of the most important ways shareholders can 
monitor a CEO’s behavior.  Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory suggests that an 
increased amount of debt limits CEO behavior; thus this paper constructs a (long-term 
debt) / assets) ratio to measure the firm’s free cash flow.   To capture the level of 
regulation within a firm this paper uses the percentage of the board comprised of outside 
" #%"
directors.  Presumably outside directors are more independent of the CEO and thus may 
better monitor the CEO. 
Prior research (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Baker and Hall, 2004) shows that firm 
size affects CEO compensation.  This paper uses the natural log of total revenue to 
measure size.  CEO’s of larger firms often have more complex jobs, thus this paper 
includes the natural log of the number of full time employees to proxy for job complexity.  
A CEO’s age and experience influence the CEO’s stock of human capital, and ultimately 
his compensation.  This paper uses the natural log of the number of years as CEO at that 
firm to help capture the portion of human capital and tenure as well as serve as a proxy 
for industry, or firm specific knowledge. 
 
 
4.3 Summary Statistics 
 
CapitalIQ, a division of Standard and Poor’s, compiles data on various measures 
of compensation for CEO’s at over 47,000 publicly traded companies, including detailed 
data on components of long-term compensation.  Table 10 presents details on the variable 
measures for the initial sample of 216 firms in 2005.  Table 11 presents the descriptive 
statistics for the firms included in the first difference regressions from 2004 vs. 2005.  
The average annual cash compensation (defined as salary + bonus) in 2005 is 
$2,583,189 (average salary is $940,685 and average bonus is $1,655,744).  In 2004 it was 
$2,566,260 (average salary was $910,029 and average bonus was $1,631,186). The long-
term compensation includes the value of restricted stock and options grants, payouts from 
long-term incentive plans, and all other compensation. The average total annual 
compensation (short and long-term compensation) in 2005 is $5,528,518.  In 2004 it was 
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$5,005,665. Both measures of compensation increase year-over-year, and have non-
normal distributions (skewed to the right). This is not unreasonable. 
This paper uses the 2002 Census of Manufactures (US Census-Commerce 
Department) data for the Herfindahl Index (HHI).  The Herfindahl Index (HHI) at the 
four-digit NAICS code level is the sum of squared market shares for the largest 50 firms 
in that industry. The U.S Department of Justice considers industries with a value of less 
than 1,000 to be competitive, 1,000-1,800 to be concentrated, and values over 1,800 to be 
highly concentrated.  In the initial sample the average HHI based on the 4-digit industry 
code in 2002 is 525.75 and was 393.90 in 1997 which shows that markets are 
“competitive” but for these two time periods but suggests markets became more 
concentrated. 
 Morningstar Financial provides the measure of performance, which represent the 
one of the independent variables.  Within the initial sample for 2005, the average one-
year total stock return is 12.7%.  For the firms used in the first difference sample, the 
average stock return in 2005 is 13.71% versus 25.06% in 2004. This shows that the 
average stock’s rate of return for the sample firms fell by half during 2005 – but is still 
positive. Other independent variables include market capitalization, the number of full 
time employees, total revenue, and the ratio of long-term debt to total assets.  Within the 
initial sample for 2005, the average firm has a $21.2 billion market capitalization, 31,503 
full time employees, $13 billion in annual revenue, and a 15% long-term debt to total 
assets ratio.  Within the firms used in the first difference sample, the average market 
capitalization in 2004 was $19.4 billion, but $19.3 billion in 2005.  Average revenue was 
$11.3 billion in 2004, but $12.9 billion in 2005.   
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5. Results 
 
Table 2 (see page 29) shows the OLS regression results with the natural log of 
total annual compensation as the dependent variable while Table 3 (see page 33) uses 
only the cash component as the dependent variable. The results in Tables 2 and 3 are 
based on the simplified equation, which excludes prior performance and the governance 
variables.25 The coefficients in Column I, which are only the control variables, are 
generally as predicted and in accordance with prior literature.26 For example the 
coefficient on the natural log (total revenue) is approximately .4, which indicates that 
when total revenue increases by 10% the average shareholders/board increase total CEO 
compensation by 4%.  Column II adds the industry concentration and concentration 
squared variables, and column III adds the product substitutability and substitutability 
squared variable. Tables 5 and 6 (see appendix) include both prior performance and the 
governance variables as additional controls.    
 
 
5.1 Total Compensation 
 
The coefficient on the industry concentration variable (HHI) shows that a 100-
unit change in the Herfindahl index (decrease in the degree of competition) leads to a 5% 
decrease in total compensation.  This coefficient has a small negative statistically 
significant coefficient at 5%, and is supportive of the oligopoly theory, i.e. CEOs which 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
25 The F-stat of .1747 (between columns I and II in table 5) and .927 (between columns I and II in table 6) 
are both less than the critical F-statistic.  This indicates that governance variables do not help explain 
determinants of compensation but rather mask the explanatory power of the other included variables.  
Additionally prior empirical papers find mixed results for the governance variables as determinants of 
compensation.  For these reasons the governance variables are excluded from Tables 2 and 3. 
26 For total and annual compensation, the only control variables that contradict prior literature are chair and 
institutional ownership. 
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face a greater degree of competition receive higher total pay.27   The positive sign on the 
coefficient for the concentration squared variable (HHI2) indicates that the degree of 
competition’s effect on CEO compensation, while small and statistically rather weak, is a 
parabolic one.  As the HHI variable increases, it eventually causes the initial regression 
relationship to switch from a negative to a positive one.  A graph shows this relationship 
on page 30. 
Since the minimum predicted total compensation occurs when the Herfindahl 
index (HHI) is 1,225, which is considered a “concentrated industry” this then suggests 
that shareholders may be better able to monitor CEO actions in oligopolistic markets. In 
such a market, CEO’s are able to engage in strategic decisions and co-operate more easily.  
As shareholders reduce the CEO’s asymmetric information advantage, the shareholders 
are theoretically able to offer weaker incentives.   The parabolic relationship supports this 
theory and shows that total compensation falls as the Herfindahl decreases (degree of 
competition increases) up until 1,225 at which total compensation rises as the Herfindahl 
decreases (degree of competition increases) from 1,225 – 0.  However, only 4 of the 216 
firms have HHI values greater than 1,225.  While the coefficient on industry 
concentration indicates shareholders offer more compensation when the degree of 
competition increases, this estimate is statistically insignificant.28 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
#("When the product substitutability variable is added, the concentration variables (HHI, HHI2) become 
statistically insignificant."
28 The firms in the sample with HHI values > 1,225 drive the negative coefficient on concentration.  
Without these four firms the relationship between concentration and compensation is negligible.  See 
column IV in Table 2, the coefficient on industry concentration becomes statistically insignificant when 
these 4 firms with HHI values > 1,225 are excluded.  Note as well that the price-cost ratio (pricecost) 
becomes significant at 10% while previously it was insignificant."
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Price-cost ratio (pricecost), the proxy for product substitutability, has a negative 
statistically insignificant coefficient and supports the oligopoly theory. The negative 
coefficient suggests that as price cost ratio increases, product substitutability 
(competition) decreases, and CEOs earn less.  As with industry concentration the sign on 
the competition variable switches from negative to positive on the squared term 
(pricecost2), which again implies a parabolic function.  Note that since the competition 
variables are insignificant at the 5% level, it is not possible to say definitely that 
increased competition allows the board and shareholders to offer weaker or stronger 
managerial incentives.   
Among the remaining independent variables, for every one percentage point 
increase in the firm’s 1-yr total stock return (TSR) the CEO’s total compensation 
increases by approximately 0.6%. For every 10% increase (or $1,000,000 increase) in 
total revenue the average CEO’s total compensation increases roughly 4% (or $173)   
These two independent variables have the greatest positive t-values, are statistically 
significant at 1%, and are in accordance with prior empirical findings. The positive 
relationship between firm performance and compensation shows an alignment between 
the shareholders’ and CEO’s interests. 
The other independent variable which is a significant determinant of 
compensation is age.  The positive coefficient indicates that for every year increase in the 
CEO’s age, the average total compensation increases by 1.8 - 2.1%, the variable is 
significant at 5%.  Only the coefficient on the number of employees is significant at 10%; 
the remaining coefficients are all statistically insignificant. 
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Figure 3 
Figure 3 (see above) shows the predicted total compensation is at a minimum 
when the HHI is 1,225.29  Note that the large value of restricted stock grants or stock 
appreciation rights the shareholders grant as part of the long-term incentive payout drive 
the high total compensation of the outlier observations.  The three CEO’s with the 
greatest compensation are in the petroleum and coal refining products industry (NAICS 
code 3241, HHI = 544.9).  For these three CEOs for the data used herein, the average 
value of restricted stock and stock appreciation rights (SAR) is $32,657,768.87. 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
29 Note that if the analysis were to graph the regression equation from columns III in Table 2, then the 
minimum predicted compensation occurs when the HHI value is 907.6, which is less concentrated than a 
HHI value of 1,225.  If the analysis uses the regression equation from column IV the minimum predicted 
compensation occurs when HHI is 627.8.  It is important to note that since industry concentration is no 
longer statistically significant in either of these regressions, the estimate is statistically insignificant. 
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5.2 Annual Cash Compensation 
 
Similar to total compensation, the competition coefficient indicates that a 100-unit 
increase in industry concentration (HHI) leads to a 6-7% decrease in average annual cash 
compensation.  The industry concentration variables (HHI, HHI2) are significant at 1%. 
Thus, industry concentration affects annual cash compensation.30  These two variables 
support the oligopoly theory that the degree of competition initially reduces annual cash 
compensation, but then compensation increases.  The estimated equations which use 
annual cash compensation as the dependent variables are more sensitive to the degree of 
competition.  In addition, the signs of the estimated coefficients for both of the squared 
competition variables (HHI2, pricecost2) switch from negative to positive.  This further 
supports the notion that a parabolic relationship between the degree of competition in the 
firm’s industry and the CEO’s annual cash compensation.   
To further examine the effect of the degree of competition has on annual cash 
compensation, consider the graph based on the regression equation in Table 3 column II 
(see page 34). Given that annual cash compensation is at a minimum when the HHI = 
1,180, this implies shareholders may be better able to monitor CEO actions and thus offer 
less compensation in more oligopolistic markets. The parabolic relationship shows that as 
industry concentration increases from 0 – 1,180 the annual cash compensation falls, but 
that when the HHI goes beyond 1,180 a CEO’s salary + bonus rise.  Consistent with the 
prior results, based on total CEO compensation, only 4 of the 216 firms in the cash 
compensation equation have HHI values greater than 1,180.  This suggests that only a 
large increase in the degree of competition is necessary for shareholders to offer greater 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
30 Note that the industry concentration and squared concentration variables are significant at 1% while the 
price-cost ratio variable (pricecost – the proxy for product substitutability) is statistically insignificant. 
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cash compensation. While the coefficient on industry concentration indicates 
shareholders offer more compensation when the degree of competition increases, this 
estimate is statistically insignificant.31 
Among the remaining control or independent variables there are some interesting 
results: for every one percentage point increase in a firm’s 1-yr total stock return (TSR) 
the average CEO’s annual cash compensation increases by approximately 0.4%. 
Additionally, for every 10% increase (or $1,000,000 increase) in total revenue, the 
average CEO’s annual cash compensation increases roughly 2.6% (or his salary + bonus 
increase by roughly $51).   These two independent variables have the greatest positive t-
values and are statistically significant at 1%.  The elasticities with respect to total stock 
return and revenue suggest that annual cash compensation is less sensitive than total 
compensation to an increase in annual revenue and total stock return.  While the 
coefficients are small, they are in accordance with prior empirical findings. 
  The other independent variables, which are significant determinants of 
compensation, are age and the number of employees.  The positive coefficient indicates 
that for every 10% increase in the number of employees, CEO cash compensation 
increases by approximately 1.2% and that salary and bonus increase roughly 1% for each 
additional year of age.32  This shows that current performance and the number of 
employees have a positive effect on a CEO’s salary and bonus.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
31 The firms in the sample with HHI values > 1,180 drive the negative coefficient on concentration.  
Without these four firms the relationship between concentration and compensation is negligible.  See 
column IV in Table 3, the coefficient on industry concentration becomes statistically insignificant when 
these 4 firms with HHI values > 1,180 are excluded."
32 The significance level on age falls from 5 to 10% when the other competition variables are included.   
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Figure 4 
Annual Cash vs. HHI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 (see above) shows predicted average cash compensation is at a minimum 
when the HHI is 1,180. 33  Note that the large annual bonus drives the high annual 
compensation for the outlier observations which all have annual pay > $6,167,155.34  The 
average annual cash compensation for these 7 CEOs is $9,327,621, with an average 
salary of $1,685,071 and an average bonus of $7,642,550.  The data reveal that of the 28 
CEOs in the data set used herein for the industry labeled Semiconductor and Other 
Electronic Component Manufacturing (NAICS code 3344,   HHI = 907.6), 20 have 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
33 Note that if the analysis were to graph either the regression equation from columns III in table 3 the 
minimum predicted compensation occurs when the HHI value is approximately 1073 rather than a HHI 
value of 1,180.  If the analysis uses the regression equation from column IV the predicted minimum 
compensation occurs when HHI is 1252.  It is important to note that since industry concentration is no 
longer statistically significant in column IV, then the estimate is statistically insignificant. 
34 This analysis defines an outlier as any observation which is more than two standard deviations away 
from the mean.  There are 7 CEOs which have annual cash compensation > $6,167,155, the annual cash 
compensation which is two standard deviations above the mean. 
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annual cash compensation below the predicted value and 23 have annual cash 
compensation below the sample average.  
 
 
5.3 First Difference: Total and Annual Cash Compensation 
 
Table 4 shows the results for the first difference regressions that use the change in 
total compensation and change in annual cash compensation from 2004 to 2005 as 
dependent variables.  Columns I and III show the results with the change in the control 
variables and the level of industry concentration variables from the 2002 Census.35  The 
coefficients on the control variables for total and annual cash compensation are as 
predicted and in accordance with prior literature.36 The coefficient on the debt/asset 
variable is positive for total CEO compensation, which is counter to theory and 
unexpected; however it is not statistically significant. Columns II and IV add the product 
substitutability and the substitutability squared variable from the 2002 Census. The 
coefficient on the change in performance variable are positive which matches theory, 
however the coefficients are all statistically insignificant which is unexpected. 
For both total cash compensation and annual cash the coefficients for the 
Herfindahl Index (HHI) are all statistically insignificant.  The negative coefficient on the 
industry concentration variable and the positive coefficient on the concentration squared 
term (HHI from the 2002 Census), while insignificant are consistent the equations in 
Tables 2 and 3.  Note that if the level of industry concentration from the 1997 industry 
concentration is used instead of the level from the 2002 Census, the coefficients are still 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
35 Note that the control variables excluded are those which have been differenced out (age, CEOyrs) and the 
governance variables excluded from the initial OLS regressions with the exception of “debtasset”. 
36 For total compensation, the control variables: total revenue and employees are significant at 1 and 5% 
respectively.  All of the control variables are insignificant for annual cash compensation. 
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negative and insignificant. The negative coefficient on the industry concentration 
supports the oligopoly theory that as the degree of competition increases, shareholders 
pay CEOs more.  Note that since the competition variables are insignificant at the 5% 
level, it is not possible to say definitely that increased competition allows the board and 
shareholders to offer weaker or stronger managerial incentives.   
" $("
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6. Robustness Check  
 
Given that the initial sample only considers surviving firms, it is important to 
examine whether the degree of competition has a different effect on firms which exited 
the market.   The analysis uses the estimation equations from Columns II and III in 
Tables 2 and 3 (these equations exclude the governance variables).  Before discussing the 
results (see Table 7 in appendix), it is important to realize that if the dummy and 
interaction variable are statistically significant, then the degree of competition will affect 
surviving and “dead” firms differently.  This suggests that there is a potential survivor 
bias in the initial analysis, and that the sample does not accurately capture how 
competition affects executive compensation. 
 In each of the regressions, however, the estimated coefficients for the dummy 
variables for surviving firms, as well as the interaction term, are statistically 
insignificant.37  This suggests that the degree of competition has a similar effect on CEO 
compensation for firms which are still public as it did for those which have been acquired 
or gone bankrupt.  What this regression cannot explain, however, is why these firms 
exited the market.  For instance: were the agency costs so extreme that they drove the 
firms out of the market or did the firms exit via a strategic acquisition? 
The industry concentration (HHI) and price-cost ratio (pricecost – the proxy for 
product substitutability) variables have the same negative coefficients as regressions II 
and III (from initial regression Tables 2 and 3).  Consistent with the results shown in 
Tables 2 and 3, the estimated effect of an increase in industry concentration (decrease in 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
37 Note that the interaction term is significant at the 10% level for total compensation but not for annual 
cash compensation.  This suggests that industry concentration has a slightly different effect on 
compensation for firms that exited the market.  Given that the coefficient is significant only at 10%, this 
paper is not overly concerned with a potential survivor bias.  
" $)"
degree of competition) is insignificant with respect to total CEO compensation, but is 
significant at 5% with respect to annual cash compensation. The coefficient on the price-
cost ratio variable becomes significant at 5% for total compensation, while previously it 
generally has been statistically insignificant. For both measures of CEO compensation, 
annual revenue and total stock return have a positive statistically significant effect at the 
1% level.   
With respect to annual cash compensation, the coefficient on the employee 
variable becomes statistically significant at 1% level. The robustness check supports the 
initial findings that the board and shareholders offer stronger incentives when the degree 
of competition increases (when either industry concentration or price-cost ratio 
decreases).  The check also supports the initial findings that there is an inflection point; 
the degree of competition and compensation have a parabolic relationship. 
 
 
7. Conclusion and Future Considerations 
 
The objective of this research was to investigate the relationship between the 
degree of competition a firm faces in its product market industry and the amount of its 
CEO compensation. Two, competing hypotheses concerning this relationship between 
competition and compensation exist in the literature.  Under principal-agent theory as 
industry concentration decreases (the degree of competition increases) shareholders 
should be able to pay the CEO less.  The oligopoly theory suggests, however, that as 
industry concentration decreases (degree of competition increases) CEOs receive less pay, 
until a point at which the CEOs receive more compensation as the degree of competition 
increases. 
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This paper’s empirical results from the initial OLS regressions, while weak, 
generally support the oligopoly theory that competition and compensation have a 
parabolic relationship. Holding everything else constant (e.g., firm size, CEO age), in 
general the lowest compensation is among firms with a Herfindahl index that lies at the 
margin between a competitive and oligopolistic industry. These results support the theory 
that the board awards the CEOs greater pay when the degree of competition increases in 
already “competitive” product markets. Similarly, as the degree of competition falls and 
firms exit those industries which are termed to be more oligopolistic and monopolistic, 
CEO compensation again rises.  These results are tenuous however, and are driven 
predominantly by the four firms, which exist, in the more concentrated industries (face a 
lesser degree of competition). This suggests that a large increase in competition is 
necessary for the board and shareholders to offer the CEO less pay. 
It is important to note a number of cautions and shortfalls about the data and 
approach taken herein, and/or to offer suggestions for future research. The primary data 
set uses 2004 and 2005 financial results and CEO compensation figures for 216 of the 
largest 500 firms in the US. Since the Census only calculates an industry concentration 
measure for the manufacturing industry (SIC code 20-39) all of these firms are in the 
manufacturing industry.  In order to merge the most recent Herfindahl Index values from 
2002 (which are used as a proxy for the degree of competition) with the 2005 fiscal year 
financial date, it was necessary to drop a number of observations.  A statistical test for 
survivor bias shows the parabolic results found in the initial analysis are not affected. The 
implicit assumption is that the sample of firms used is representative of the general 
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population of firms. However, if they are not, then the results reported herein could be 
suspect. 
The Herfindahl Index is one of the two measures for the degree of competition 
this study uses. While used in prior literature, one limitation of the Herfindahl Index is 
that it “shoe-horns” all firms into a specific industry, as discussed earlier in the example 
of 3M.  One way to supplement the Herfindahl's shortcoming is to look at a firm’s gross 
profit capacity as an additional measure of the degree of competition. This variable 
attempts to proxy whether a firm, with a high ratio of revenues to cost of goods sold, 
faces relatively less competition in the form of product substitutability than a firm with a 
low ratio. Unfortunately, the available data for this study did not include full income-
statement variables necessary to readily calculate this ratio.  
This study uses the same variable construction as Karuna (2007), who constructs 
a gross profit variable from the 2002 census.  This “price-cost” variable is “Total value of 
shipments / (cost of materials + production workers wage) at a given 4-digit NAICS code 
level. A limitation of this approach would occur when comparing two otherwise 
comparable-industry firms when one subcontracts out its manufacturing (e.g. Nike) and 
the other does not.  As presented in Tables 2-4 the coefficients on the price-cost variable 
were consistently small and not statistically different from zero.38  Indeed, the 
coefficients estimated on this second variable are consistently small and not statistically 
significantly different from zero. Adding them to the equation yields no contribution to 
the equation's explanatory power (adjusted r-squared). 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
38 Karuna however finds this variable to be statistically significant. 
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It is important to summarize and point out that the dominant variable affecting 
CEO compensation is firm size. In general the results show that a 10% increase in a 
firm's revenue (everything else being held constant) results in roughly a 4% increase in 
the CEO's compensation. Nearly 50% of the variance in CEO pay can be accounted for 
by the size variables (a firm’s total revenue and number of full time employees). There is 
strong support for human capital as an important determinant of CEO compensation as 
there is a positive statistically significant relationship between CEO age and CEO 
compensation. This study also employs a number of other control variables suggested 
from the literature. Interestingly, while some of them receive substantial news coverage 
(e.g., % of the board that is outsiders), the estimated effects are overshadowed by the 
effect of firm size.  Unfortunately, the same is true of competition variables examined in 
this research: their estimated effects pale relative to the effect of firm size. 
For future research it would be interesting to examine whether the market and 
shareholders place a premium on how shareholders compensate CEOs. If a firm grants $5 
million in total compensation - of which $3 million is defined as other compensation, 
does the market place an “embarrassment premium” on the value of the company?  That 
is, does that firm have a lower price / earnings (P/E) ratio or other valuation metric such 
that the CEO is not able to maximize shareholder value.  If so, this may provide an 
explanation for the documented trend in incentives structures over time. It would also be 
interesting to examine whether parabolic relationship between the degree of competition 
and level of compensation hold in other industries, outside of the manufacturing industry. 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
Estimation Issues 
In order to properly analyze the regressions it is necessary to test the cross-
sectional and first difference data for estimation issues.  One of the most prevalent issues 
to test for in cross-sectional data is heteroskedasticity.  This paper uses the Breusch-
Pagan test to examine the null hypothesis that constant variance exists within the data.  
The results of these tests all reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity.  This is not 
surprising as heteroskedasticity is more likely to occur in cross-sectional data, 
particularly when there is large variance in the dependant variable.  This paper uses 
robust standard errors to correct for the estimation issue, which is a standard econometric 
remedy. 
The other relevant test for cross-sectional data is the test for multicollinearity.  
The tables on the following page show the correlation coefficients of the variables and 
presents evidence of multicollinearity. Despite the presence of multicollinearity, it is not 
necessary to remove any variables as theory states that multicolinear variables should still 
be included.  For instance, firms with large market capitalization are likely to have 
greater revenue and are likely to have more employees.  Even though these variables are 
collinear, they should be included as they have different effects on CEO compensation. 
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Multicollinearity tables 
 
Initial Sample (From Sample used in Tables 2 and 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Difference in Difference Sample (From Sample used in Table 4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robustness Check Sample (From Sample used in Table 7) 
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Breakdown of CEO Total Compensation 
(In 2005 for 216 firms in initial sample) 
 
 
 
Other annual compensation: includes travel expenses, social dues (i.e. country    
                                               clubs)…this varies from firm to firm 
 
All other compensation: includes 401k matching, tax preparations, life insurance,  
                                         vacation accruals...this varies from firm to firm 
 
Restricted compensation: value of restricted stock granted to CEO 
                                         
Other: contains all other compensation, other annual compensation, restricted stock and   
           option grants, long term incentive plan, non-equity incentive plan, changes in  
           Pension plan/non-Qualified Deferred Comp Earnings 
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